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Bubbles and Leverage 
 
 
 
This paper analyses the relationship between leverage and asset price „bubbles‟. During an 
important historical bubble there was a substantial expansion in the number of railways 
promoted, most of which were financed by shares which could be purchased on an instalment 
basis. An analysis of a new and comprehensive dataset suggests that these assets can be 
modelled as futures or options, implying that investors were purchasing highly leveraged 
derivatives. The leverage embedded in these assets amplified returns and made it possible to 
obtain exposure to an asset for a small deposit. However, during the downturn negative 
returns were also magnified and investors had difficulties paying further instalments. 
Although leverage may have initially increased demand for these assets, they did not become 
overpriced, possibly due to a substantial increase in their supply.  
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The prominent role of mortgages and derivatives in the recent „Housing Bubble‟ has led to 
the suggestion that there may be some relationship between asset price „bubbles‟ and the use 
of leverage. For example, Geithner (2010) has remarked that prior to the Credit Crunch „we 
let leverage build up on a massive scale.‟ This paper analyses the effects of leverage by 
examining an historical period known as the British Railway Mania. 
During this period the prices of railway shares increased dramatically, but the market then 
crashed and share prices fell considerably. The boom was associated with a substantial 
increase in the promotion of new railway companies, with at least 1,000 new railway lines 
being projected at this time. Most of these new companies issued shares with uncalled capital, 
which meant that investors could acquire the asset by paying a small initial deposit, and by 
agreeing to make a series of regular payments in the future. 
To enable a comprehensive analysis of this episode, which the Economist (2008) has 
described as „arguably the greatest bubble in history‟, a new dataset, consisting of daily share 
prices for all railway securities listed on the London Stock Exchange between 1843 and 1850, 
has been collected from original newspaper tables. The analysis in this paper begins with a 
cointegration analysis relating fully-paid shares and partially-paid instalment plan shares, 
which suggests that there was a spot-future relationship between these assets, implying that 
the partially-paid shares could be modelled as futures. There is also some evidence of 
partially-paid shares being treated as call options, with a significantly higher default rate on 
payments when the price of a share was below the implied exercise price. If partially-paid 
shares were analogous to derivatives, then it implies that the leverage which results from the 
use of derivatives was available to investors during the Railway Mania. 
An important consequence of leverage was to amplify the returns which investors 
experienced. An analysis of first-day returns suggests that subscribers to the IPOs of new 
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railway companies, on average, could have doubled their investment if they sold their shares 
on the first-day that they were listed on the market. Throughout the boom the market price of 
railway shares was, on average, more than double the amount that investors had paid up in 
capital. However, this was largely due to the structure of the assets which gave investors 
exposure to price changes for only a small deposit. If investors had been required to pay the 
full cost of the asset immediately, their returns would have been fairly modest. The structure 
of the assets meant that during the downturn the losses experienced were also magnified. 
Another feature of leverage was to affect the timing with which investors had to make their 
payments. During the boom shareholders had to initially deposit an average of less than 10 
per cent of their total liability. At the market peak almost two hundred new railways were 
listed on the stock market, but enough capital had been deposited to fully finance less than 
twenty of these companies. During the construction phase there were a large number of calls 
for capital, which meant that investors had to make further payments to the companies. This 
resulted in deleveraging, and there is evidence of substantial price declines in the weeks when 
these calls were made. 
The potential for higher returns, and the ability to pay for assets on an instalment plan, may 
have increased the demand for highly leveraged assets. This would tend to increase the price 
of partially-paid shares relative to other assets. However, the increased risk, and the 
considerable increase in the supply of assets, may have meant that the equilibrium price was 
not particularly high. A comparison between the prices of the highly leveraged shares of the 
new railways, and a sample of non-railways, suggests that the new railways were not 
overpriced. 
This analysis contributes to our understanding of the link between asset price reversals and 
leverage. It suggests that leverage may not necessarily affect the prices of assets, but it may 
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have an impact on the financial position of investors. Leverage may be employed during the 
boom, as it amplifies positive returns and reduces the amount of capital which must be 
deposited, but it could produce difficulties during a downturn, by magnifying negative returns 
and enforcing deleveraging when payments are required.  
This paper adds to other research into the relationship between leverage and asset price 
reversals, such as that of Kindleberger (2000, p.14) who has suggested that a boom can be fed 
by an expansion of bank credit. Allen and Gale (2001) have argued that using borrowed 
money to invest in risky assets is relatively attractive because it is possible to avoid losses by 
defaulting on the loan, which leads to investors bidding up asset prices. Bernanke and Gertler 
(2001) have discussed how an initial increase in asset prices can improve the collateral of 
investors, which increases borrowing, which can increase demand and prices further. Aoki et 
al. (2002) have examined the links between house prices, collateral and borrowing in the 
United Kingdom. Detken and Smets (2004) have found that real credit and money growth 
have been relatively strong before and during booms in 18 countries since the 1970s. 
This paper is organised as follows. The next two sections give a brief overview of the 
Railway Mania, and of the data which has been used. The third section considers whether 
partially-paid shares can be viewed as futures or options. The fourth section discusses the 
relationship between leverage and returns, the fifth section considers the impact of leverage 
on the timing of payments, the sixth section considers the effect on pricing, with the final 
section being a brief conclusion. 
1  Expansion during the British Railway Mania 
The first modern railway, the Liverpool and Manchester, was promoted in 1824 and opened 
in 1830. Within the next decade about sixty other railways obtained Parliamentary 
authorisation, with most of these projects being promoted in a minor boom during 1836 and 
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1837. Whilst the economy was weak, and these railways were being constructed, share prices 
remained low and the promotion of new lines was subdued. However, between 1843 and 
August 1845, railway share prices rose rapidly in a period which has become known as the 
Railway Mania. Figure 1 shows several market indices, constructed by Campbell and Turner 
(2010), which illustrate a pronounced rise in prices amongst all railway companies, and in the 
subset of railway companies which had already been established before the Mania began.  
<< INSERT FIGURE 1 >> 
Several suggestions have been offered for the cause of the price changes which were 
experienced at this time. Bryer (1991) has argued that the Mania could have been an attempt 
to „swindle‟ investors, but this view has been challenged by McCartney and Arnold (2003). 
Odlyzko (2010) has suggested that „collective hallucinations‟ were responsible for the Mania, 
whilst Campbell (2010) has argued that changes in the dividends paid by the established 
railways were the main cause of the price changes which occurred during this period. Despite 
this research, there has been little detail provided on the new companies promoted at this 
time, or on the assets which they issued. 
As with some other periods of rapid asset price growth, such as the South Sea Bubble of 
1720, the boom of 1825, and the Dot-Com Bubble of the 1990s, there was a substantial 
increase in the promotion of new companies during the Railway Mania. The number of 
railway securities listed on the London Stock Exchange underestimates the extent of 
promotion, as only a small proportion ever achieved a listing, but the number of listed 
securities follows the pattern in prices with a lag, as shown in Figure 2. 
<< INSERT FIGURE 2 >> 
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Most of the new schemes issued partially-paid shares with uncalled capital, which meant that 
investors paid a small deposit and would then make future payments when the process of 
construction required it. Shares issued during the Railway Mania, and throughout much of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth century, were quoted with a nominal value, a par value and the 
market price. The nominal value of the share was the total amount that original shareholders 
were initially liable to pay to the company. The par value of the share was the amount that 
shareholders had already paid to the company.  
The difference between the nominal and par value reflected uncalled capital, which was the 
amount that shareholders were still liable to pay to the company. Uncalled capital could be 
used in several ways, with banks and insurance companies generally retaining it as a reserve, 
but the railways tended to call it up in regular instalments to finance the construction of their 
lines. Figure 3 illustrates the rapid increase in nominal value during the boom in railway 
shares, compared to a more gradual rise in par value. This reflects the issuance of the new 
securities which had only a small proportion of capital initially paid up. 
<< INSERT FIGURE 3 >> 
Railway share prices peaked in August 1845, but fell by 18 per cent during the next three 
months, just as the promotion of new railway schemes reached unprecedented levels. Many 
of the railways promoted at the height of the boom never received Parliamentary 
authorisation, and others faced difficulties when they began to lay their line, but the extent of 
railway construction was still impressive. Estimates by Mitchell (1964) suggest that railway 
investment represented 5.7 per cent of GDP in 1846, 6.7 per cent in 1847, and 4.7 per cent in 
1848. However, the magnitude of railway expansion proved to be unsustainable, with the size 
of investment being amongst a range of factors blamed by a Parliamentary Committee for the 
Commercial Crisis of 1847 (Parliamentary Papers, 1847-48, VIII, Pt. I, p.4). Concerns about 
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overexpansion led several of the leading railways to announce they would not proceed with 
much of the planned construction in October 1848 (Economist, November 4, 1848, p.1241). It 
was not until near the end of the decade that most of the remaining construction had been 
completed, and the new railways began to operate. 
2 Data 
Data on the number of shares in issue, the nominal value, the par value, and the market price 
of every railway security listed on the London Stock Exchange between 1843 and 1850 was 
obtained on a daily basis from the Railway Times, the leading railway newspaper during this 
period. Data from each table, containing an average of 242.1 securities for each of the 417 
weeks in the sample, was computerised and each table was then merged to produce a 
comprehensive dataset. Due to the high number of listings and delistings the total number of 
securities included in the dataset is 868, representing 442 railway companies. 
Preference shares (88 securities) and assets issued by railways outside Great Britain and 
Ireland (84 securities) were excluded. When some companies were first listed some of the 
data on the number of shares, nominal value or par value were not reported. In these cases the 
next reported data was assumed to be correct for the missing period. If this data was not 
reported at any future period, the Railway Shareholders’ Manual (Tuck, 1845) was used to 
obtain the missing details. There were 150 securities where data on either the number of 
shares or par value could not be ascertained. 
Several additional variables were also included. The value of uncalled capital for each asset 
was calculated as the difference between the nominal value and the par value of that asset. 
Data on dividends, for the subset of companies which were also reported in the Course of the 
Exchange (a share list produced by a stockbroker) were also recorded. The risk-free rate was 
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approximated as the yield on Consols, government debt perpetuities, which was also obtained 
from the Course of the Exchange. 
3 Embedded Leverage 
The partially-paid shares issued during the Railway Mania were paid for in instalments. This 
meant that investors subscribed to the shares for a small deposit, and then paid a fixed 
amount at future dates. This feature makes them resemble future contracts, assuming that 
investors could not default on their payments, or option contracts, assuming that default was 
possible. One of the characteristics of these types of derivatives is the leverage which results 
from their structure. Investors effectively borrow the funds from the counterparty, and obtain 
exposure to the movements of the underlying asset by paying only a small initial amount. If 
partially-paid shares can be modelled as derivative-like assets, then it suggests that the 
leverage which results from these asset classes was available to investors during this period. 
3.1 Partially-paid Shares as Futures 
The relationship between fully-paid and partially-paid shares can be illustrated by a no 
arbitrage argument. Investors should receive the same return from purchasing a fully-paid up 
share, or from purchasing a partially-paid up share and paying the remaining liability. 
Assuming that investors could not default on their liability, a partially-paid share can be 
modelled as a future contract with a fixed payment in the future, and the fully-paid share can 
be regarded as the underlying security, as suggested by Dale et al. (2005). Equation 1 adapts 
the standard future pricing relationship, as stated by Hull (2003, p.50), to this situation and 
accounts for dividends which can be expressed as a percentage of the future payment. 
              
where: S = Price of fully-paid share, f = Price of partially-paid share,  
K = Size of future payment, r = Risk-free interest rate, q = Dividend rate 
(1) 
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To illustrate the implications of uncalled capital on the market price of an asset an example 
will be used of the relationship between the fully-paid and partially-paid shares issued by the 
Great Western Railway (GWR), before a more comprehensive analysis of other companies. 
When only the market prices of the assets are compared, the difference in prices appears to 
change over time, as suggested in Panel A of Figure 4. However, a fairer comparison would 
be between the fully-paid „GWR Half Shares‟ and the implied price of an equivalent fully-
paid „GWR Original Share‟. This implied price can be estimated using Equation 1, by 
adjusting the price of the partially-paid „GWR Original Share‟ to take account of uncalled 
capital. Once these adjustments have been made, for each day of the sample between 1843 
and 1850, there appears to be a close relationship between the implied prices of the fully-paid 
shares, as shown in Panel B of Figure 4. 
<< INSERT FIGURE 4 >> 
It is possible to introduce a more systematic analysis, which can be used to examine a wider 
sample of companies, by testing for cointegration. By using the Engle-Granger 2-step 
approach (Engle and Granger, 1987) it is possible to test if the residual from a regression 
between two time series is stationary. This test for cointegration has been carried out for the 
pair of GWR assets discussed above, and then repeated for all other companies which had 
partially and fully paid shares listed simultaneously. To be included in the analysis a pair of 
assets had to be issued by the same company, have the same pro rata dividend rights, and 
both be listed on the stock market for at least one year, and be traded on average at least once 
per week. Any assets which delisted and were then relisted with a different nominal or par 
value were excluded. The size of the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) statistic, and its 
significance, for each cointegration test is shown in Table 1.  
<< INSERT TABLE 1 >> 
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The results suggest that when uncalled capital is accounted for, either as a separate variable 
or to produce a notional fully-paid share, there is evidence of cointegration for almost every 
pair of assets.  This implies that investors were pricing partially-paid shares as if they were 
future contracts, which means that investors who purchased these assets were effectively 
purchasing assets with embedded leverage. 
3.2 Partially-paid Shares as Options 
The discussion has thus far assumed that the contract which subscribers entered into to pay 
future instalments was a binding obligation. However, Shea (2007b) has suggested that it 
may be better to treat these assets as options, as the holder may have had the right, but not the 
obligation, to pay a future amount and obtain a fully-paid share.  
During the Railway Mania the legal framework for this issue was set down in the Companies‟ 
Clauses Consolidation Act (Parliamentary Papers, 1845, II, p.226-227). If a shareholder had 
failed to pay a call two months after it was due, the company could sue the shareholder and 
attempt to recover the amount due with interest, or the directors could declare the share 
forfeited. At least another two months had to pass before the declaration of forfeiture could 
be confirmed at a general meeting, which would allow the company to sell the forfeited 
shares.  
By suing shareholders the company could hope to obtain the full amount due, but they would 
have to pay legal expenses. By forfeiting the share these expenses could be avoided, and the 
company could sell the share in the secondary market. During the construction of the early 
railways (pre-1843), the practice of forfeiting shares seems to have been preferred by at least 
some of the companies. For example, the Cheltenham and Great Western Railway had 
originally issued 7,500 shares, but by 1843 only 5,693 remained in issue, with the rest having 
been forfeited for non-payment of calls (MacDermot, 1964, p.83).  
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It should have been in the best interests of an investor to forfeit a share if the amount which 
the investor was required to pay was greater than the value of that share after that payment 
had been made. The default condition should therefore have been given by Equation 2. 
      
where: S = Price of asset after payment of instalment 
 K = Size of instalment 
(2) 
By analysing data on the arrears outstanding on the instalments due on the shares of various 
railway companies, taken from Parliamentary Papers (1848, LXIII, p.275-442), it is possible 
to estimate whether investors chose to forfeit a partially-paid share based on the criteria given 
in Equation 2. The arrears data states the amount that investors had paid on that instalment 
and the amount which was still outstanding in August 1848, when the data was collected. 
Alternative scenarios are considered which consider whether companies enforced forfeiture if 
payment was not made after either two months, four months, one year or two years. Table 2 
shows how many times the default condition was met under the various scenarios. 
<< INSERT TABLE 2 >> 
The results for the timeframe of four months, one year and two years suggest that there was a 
significantly higher default rate when it was in the best interests of investors to default. 
Although it may be inappropriate to assume that partially-paid shares were pure call options, 
the difference in default rates depending on the default criteria suggests that some investors 
did treat them this way. 
4 Amplifying Returns 
The discussion in the previous section has suggested that there is evidence that the partially-
paid shares listed during the Railway Mania were considered by investors as either futures or 
options. This implies that the leverage associated with derivatives was available to investors 
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during this period. This section will consider the impact that this leverage had on returns, 
initially examining first-day returns before considering returns throughout the period. 
4.1 First-day Returns 
Investors who subscribed to railway IPOs were asked to pay the par value of the share as a 
deposit. They would then be liable to pay calls up to the amount of the nominal value of the 
shares when the company requested it. An investor who subscribed to IPOs in the primary 
market and then sold those shares on the first-day that they traded on the secondary market 
would receive a return given by Equation 3. The abnormal return has been calculated by 
subtracting the return on that day from an index of all railway shares which has been 
constructed by Campbell and Turner (2010). 
          
                 
        
 
where: r = Return, P = Price, Z = Par Value  
(3) 
Table 3 shows that the size of the return which subscribers to new schemes could obtain 
during the boom was substantial, with a mean abnormal first-day return of 76.2 per cent in 
1844, and 106.7 per cent in 1845. This is consistent with commentary during the period, such 
as the remark by the Railway Investment Guide (1845, p.10) that „it will be obvious that the 
party who has had certain shares allotted to him, which rise to a premium (as they almost 
invariably do, at least for a time) has the whole of that premium for his profit. By this means, 
persons possessing only sufficient capital to pay the deposit, may more than double it in a 
day‟. 
<< INSERT TABLE 3 >> 
If investors had been required to pay the total cost of the asset immediately, rather than in 
instalments, their return would be given by Equation 4. The cost of the fully-paid share can 
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be implied by adjusting the par value to include the discounted sum of future calls. The price 
of the fully-paid share can be implied by adjusting the price of a partially-paid share 
according to the futures pricing relationship, if it is assumed default is not possible. For this 
analysis a discount rate of three per cent is used, which was close to the yield on Government 
Consols, but unreported analysis suggests that similar results are obtained when other rates 
are used.  
       
                          
        
                          
 
where:  r = Return, P = Price, Z = Par Value,  
K = Size of future payment, r = Risk-free interest rate, q = Dividend rate 
 
(4) 
When considering the scenario that default was possible, the price of a fully-paid share can be 
implied by using an options pricing formula. Shea (2007a) has suggested modelling these 
assets as n-fold compound call options. To facilitate computation for such an extensive 
dataset, this paper considers them as 2-fold compound call options, and uses the closed form 
formula proposed by Geske (1979). This implies that investors were initially purchasing 
assets which gave them the right on the first exercise date to pay the first instalment K1, and 
receive a call option which gave them the right on the second exercise date to pay the 
remaining liability, K2, and receive the underlying asset. A volatility of 30 per cent has been 
used for this analysis, which is close to the median volatility of 28 per cent for fully-paid 
shares in the sample. Other volatilities have also been considered, although not reported, and 
produce similar results. 
Table 3 shows that the average returns which would have been experienced if only fully-paid 
shares had been issued were just 5.5 per cent in 1844 and 7.1 per cent in 1845 if the partially-
paid share was regarded as a future contract, or 5.0 per cent in 1844 and 3.4 per cent in 1845 
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if the partially-paid share was regarded as an option contract. The difference between the 
returns for partially-paid shares and fully-paid shares was substantial and significant during 
these years. 
These results suggest that the first-day returns for underlying ordinary shares were not 
particularly high, but the return which was experienced was considerable because the full 
premium was embedded in an asset on which only a small deposit was required. The impact 
of uncalled capital was to magnify the first-day returns experienced by investors in new 
companies. Thus the dramatic returns which investors experienced at this time from investing 
in new companies were at least partially due to the effects of leverage.  
4.2 Returns throughout Mania 
To estimate the impact on shareholder returns throughout the Mania a similar analysis can be 
repeated for each day of the sample period. If an investor subscribed to all new railway IPOs, 
and then paid all subsequent calls when they were due, their cost at any particular time can be 
calculated as the sum of the par values of all new companies. The market capitalisation at any 
particular time reflected the price at which investors could sell their shares. Consequently, a 
simple measure for estimating the return to investors was the price/par ratio. A price/par ratio 
of 1 suggested that the current market price equalled the amount which had already been 
invested. A price/par ratio of 2 suggested that the original investors had made a 100 per cent 
return, whilst a price/par ratio of 0.5 suggested investors had lost 50 per cent of their original 
investment. 
The average price/par ratios for the established railways and new railways were calculated for 
each day between 1844 and 1850, and are illustrated in Figure 5. The price/par ratio of the 
new companies reached a peak of 2.74, which meant that an investor who had subscribed to 
all the new companies would have earned a return of 174 per cent. The price for each 
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equivalent fully-paid share, when the partially-paid share is considered as a future contract, 
has been calculated for each day of the sample. Alternative scenarios for the discount rate 
have been employed, being -10 per cent, 0 per cent and +10 per cent. The implied price of 
each equivalent fully-paid share, when the partially-paid share is treated as an option 
contract, has been calculated using the approach of Geske (1979). To obtain a range of 
scenarios volatilities of 20 per cent, 30 per cent and 40 per cent were analysed. The implied 
total market capitalisation and the total par value for all of the new railways have been used 
to calculate the implied price/par ratio for the industry, for each day, which is shown in 
Figure 5.  
<< INSERT FIGURE 5 >> 
When partially-paid shares are treated as a future contract the average price/par ratio of the 
equivalent fully-paid shares of new railways reached a peak of between 1.12 and 1.18 
depending on what assumptions are made about the discount rate. When partially-paid shares 
are treated as option contracts, a peak of between 0.98 and 1.11 was reached, depending on 
the assumptions regarding volatility.  In each instance the results suggest that the returns 
which investors would have experienced from investing in fully-paid shares would have been 
relatively low, but due to the leveraged nature of the partially-paid shares the returns which 
they actually experienced were substantial. 
5 Instalment Payments 
The use of leveraged derivatives also affects when investors must provide payment. Rather 
than paying the full amount initially, the use of leverage makes it possible to obtain an asset 
for a small initial deposit. The ability to obtain exposure to the price movements of assets 
without having to immediately find the total capital required may have contributed to the 
number of new railways promoted at this time, and to the enthusiasm with which investors 
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subscribed to the new schemes. The Economist (April 5, 1845, p.310) noted that „it is one of 
their peculiar characteristics but yet not less ultimately dangerous and deceptive on that 
account, that from the delay of procuring the act and getting it into operation the period when 
the main bulk of capital is required is remote from that when the greatest excitement and 
speculation exists, and no immediate check is therefore experienced by calls of capital.‟  
The substantial difference between the amount that investors were liable to pay (the nominal 
value), and the amount which they had paid so far (the par value), is reported in Table 4 for 
the end of each year. Only companies where the details of both the nominal and par values 
are available are included in the analysis.  
<< INSERT TABLE 4 >> 
It can be seen from Table 4 that the total nominal value of new railways at the end of 1844 
was £39.6m, and at the end of 1845 was £158.0m. In contrast, the total par value of these new 
railways was just £3.7m in 1844, and £15.6m in 1845, which means that during the boom in 
prices and promotions investors had been asked to pay up less than 10 per cent of their total 
liability. This implies that although 44 new railway companies had been listed by the end of 
1844, investors had only provided enough capital to fully finance 4.1 companies. By the end 
of 1845, when 186 new railway companies were listed, investors had provided enough capital 
to entirely finance just 18.5 companies. 
When payments were eventually demanded, the resulting deleveraging may have contributed 
to a decline in prices. Investors were required to make regular and sizeable payments on their 
partially-paid shares during the construction phase, especially between 1846 and 1848, as 
shown in Figure 6. 
<< INSERT FIGURE 6 >> 
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The Times (July 30, 1845, p.4) had issued warnings at the height of the Mania about the 
extent and impact of future calls for capital. They said „soon or late the day will come when 
an untold proportion of this year‟s scripholders will be doubly pressed, no longer able to 
suffer the sums they have already paid to remain buried in the earthworks of an unfinished 
line, much less to pay up the quick recurring calls of the company‟. The Economist (October 
21, 1848, p.1187) noted that „every fresh call that was made upon exhausted shareholders was 
attended by one of two effects – either the shares themselves upon which the call had been 
made were sold in order to avoid payment, or some other shares were sold in order to raise 
the money for that purpose. There was constantly an increasing number of sellers, and a 
constantly diminishing number of buyers.‟ This led to the result that „lines in course of 
construction in place of increasing in price as more and more capital became invested in 
them, have after each new call fallen about as much as they should have risen.‟ 
To estimate the impact which these calls for capital had on prices, 971 changes in capital 
were analysed as shown in Table 5. When a company issued a call, its return during that 
week was calculated, with the abnormal return being calculated as the company return minus 
the return on an index of all railway shares which has been constructed by Campbell and 
Turner (2010). If an asset was not traded in the week during which the call was made the 
calculation was carried out for the week that it was next traded.  
<< INSERT TABLE 5 >> 
An analysis of all 971 calls for capital between 1843 and 1850 suggests that a share had an 
average abnormal return of -9.7 per cent in the week that a call was made on it, as shown in 
Table 5. The most likely reason for the falls in prices was investors selling some shares to pay 
the instalments on others. If a three week period is analysed, there was an average abnormal 
return of -8.4 per cent, and if a five week period is considered, there was an average abnormal 
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return of -4.7 per cent. The results from these longer windows suggest that part of the decline 
was temporary, reflecting the short-term difficulties which investors had in meeting the 
demand for further payments. Nevertheless, there is still evidence of substantial declines 
which, combined with the number of calls which were made, would suggest that this 
exercised a considerable downward pressure on prices during this period. This implies that 
the process of deleveraging contributed to the decline in prices during the downturn.  
6 Impact on Pricing 
It is possible that leverage may initially increase the demand for an asset by raising expected 
returns, and by providing easier payment terms. This would suggest that the price of the asset 
could be higher than it would have been if leverage was not available. However, this increase 
in demand may be at least partially offset by the increased risk of the asset. It is also possible 
that an increase in the price of assets could be followed by an increase in the supply of assets, 
reducing the equilibrium price. The net impact of leverage on the price of an asset is thus 
ambiguous. 
The impact of leverage on pricing during the Railway Mania can be assessed by comparing 
the prices of highly leveraged assets, namely those issued by the new railways, with other 
assets. A basic approach to assessing the relative price of an asset is to compare its dividend 
yield with other assets. As the new railways promoted at this time could not pay a dividend 
until they had finished construction and began operation, a current dividend yield cannot be 
calculated for their early stages. However, it is possible to use an approximation to calculate 
what dividend they would eventually have to achieve to produce a similar return to the non-
railways and established railways. The dividend yield can be expressed in terms of the 
dividend/par ratio and price/par ratio, as shown in Equation 5. 
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(5) 
The highest price/par ratio of the new railways from the various scenarios discussed above 
was 1.18, assuming a partially paid share can be treated as a future contract, and using a 
discount rate of 10 per cent. During 1845 a sample of non-railway companies were trading at 
an average dividend yield of 4.5 per cent (Campbell, 2010), so to achieve a similar yield the 
new railways should have been producing a dividend/par ratio of 5.3 per cent. This is a lower 
bound estimate, as it does not take account of the much greater uncertainty surrounding the 
new railways, or the foregone dividends during the construction phase, but it provides an 
approximation for required performance.  
The dividend/par ratio of the established railways peaked at 7.2 per cent during the Mania 
(Campbell, 2010). An analysis of the prospectuses of 85 new railways collected from 
advertisements in the Railway Times (1843-45) suggests that the promoters of these new 
railways encouraged investors to expect an average dividend/par ratio of 7.9 per cent. The 
lower bound estimate of the required dividend/par ratio to justify the price of the new 
railways was therefore much lower than either the established railways or the prospectuses of 
the new railways suggested was possible. 
These calculations have been performed using the highest price/par ratio of any scenario 
which has been discussed above. If a more reasonable discount rate is used, or partially paid 
shares were options, then the implied dividend rate would have been even lower, suggesting 
that the prices of new railway shares were not particularly high during the Railway Mania, 
even at the market peak.  
7 Conclusion 
Using an extensive dataset, this paper has analysed the pricing of assets with uncalled capital 
during the British Railway Mania. It has provided evidence that the partially-paid assets listed 
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on the market at this time may be modelled as either futures or options, which implies that 
investors who purchased these assets were effectively purchasing highly leveraged 
derivatives. 
The evidence presented above suggests that the first impact of this leverage was to amplify 
the returns to investors. First-day returns for partially-paid shares were significantly higher 
than the returns which investors would have received if they had only been able to purchase 
fully-paid shares. The returns, throughout the boom, which were accumulated by investors in 
new railways were substantially increased by the effects of leverage, but during the downturn 
negative returns were also magnified.  
The second impact of leverage was to allow investors to purchase assets on an instalment 
payment plan. Investors could subscribe to shares in new companies for a small deposit. This 
meant that although almost two hundred new railways had been listed on the market at its 
peak, enough capital had been provided to finance only about twenty of them. When 
payments were subsequently required, the resulting deleveraging was associated with price 
declines. 
The combined effects of higher expected returns, and easier payment terms, may have 
increased the demand for the assets issued by the new railways. However, possibly due to the 
increased risk, and the substantial increase in the supply of assets, the new railways did not 
have a much higher price than the non-railways at this time. 
These results suggest that leverage may play an important role in „bubbles‟. Although its 
influence on prices may be limited, it affects the returns experienced by investors, and the 
timing of flows of capital. The use of leverage may initially appear to be attractive to 
investors, as it amplifies positive returns and reduces the amount of capital required for 
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investment, but it can lead to problems in a downturn, when negative returns are magnified, 
and deleveraging occurs. 
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Figure 1: Weekly Market Indices of All Railways, Established Railways and 
Non-Railways,  1843-50 
 
 
 
Source: Campbell and Turner (2010). 
Notes: Railway share indices calculated from weekly share price tables in Railway Times (1843-50).  Non-Railway share index 
calculated from weekly share price tables in Course of the Exchange (1843-50). The All-Railway index includes all railway securities, 
whereas the Established-Railway index includes those railways which were operating before January 1843.  The Non-Railway index 
includes the twenty largest non-railways by market capitalization. Capital gains for each company are weighted by market 
capitalization to produce weekly market indices. 
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Figure 2: Number of Railway Securities Listed on London Stock Exchange,  
and Railway Share Index 1843-50 
 
 
Notes: Railway share index and number of securities listed on London Stock Exchange calculated from weekly share 
price tables in Railway Times (1843-50). Market index constructed from market returns, which have been calculated 
by weighting the returns of the component companies by their market capitalisation at the start of the day. 
 
  
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1,600
1,800
2,000
2,200
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
1843 1844 1845 1846 1847 1848 1849 1850
M
a
r
k
e
t 
In
d
e
x
N
u
m
b
e
r
 o
f 
S
e
c
u
r
it
ie
s
Railway Securities listed on LSE
All Railways Share Index
 24 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Total Par Value and Nominal Value of Railway Shares Listed on 
London Stock Exchange, 1843-50 
 
 
Notes: Nominal Value and Par Value for each company listed on London Stock Exchange obtained from weekly share price 
tables in Railway Times (1843-50). Industry Nominal and Par Values calculated by summing individual companies. 
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Figure 4: Daily Share Prices of a GWR Full Share and Two Half Shares, 1843-50 
 
 
Panel A: Prices Observed in Market 
 
Panel B: Prices Adjusted for Uncalled Capital Discounted at Actual 
Risk-Free and Dividend Rates 
  
 
 
 
Notes: Share prices obtained on a daily basis from weekly share price tables in Railway 
Times (1843-50). 
 
Notes: Share prices and par values obtained from weekly share price tables in Railway 
Times (1843-50). Implied price of a GWR original share calculated using Equation 1. 
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Figure 5: Price/Par Ratio of New Railways, 1844-50 
 
Panel A: Shares Treated as Futures, using Alternative 
Scenarios of Discount Rate 
Panel B: Shares Treated as Compound Call Options, using Alternative 
Scenarios of Volatility 
 
 
Notes: Implied market capitalisation and par value calculated for individual new railways, 
promoted after 1843, using alternative scenarios of the interest and dividend rates. Implied 
price/par ratio of all new railways calculated as implied total market price/total cost. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: When treated as  a future the implied price/par ratio calculated as total price/total cost 
using an interest rate of 3 per cent and dividend rate of 0 per cent to discount uncalled capital. 
When treated as an option the price of a partially-paid share is assumed to be the price of a 
compound call option, using alternative assumptions about volatility. The pricing formula for a 
compound call option (Geske, 1979) was used to imply the price of an underlying fully-paid 
share for each company. 
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Figure 6: Weekly Railways Calls and Railway Share Index 1843-50 
 
 
 
Notes: Railway share index and volume of calls calculated from weekly share price tables in Railway Times 
(1843-50). 
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Table 1: Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Tests of Residual from Estimated Cointegrating Relationships between Fully-paid and 
Partially-paid Shares of Established Railway Companies 
 
  
Variables Included in Cointegrating Relationship 
 
  
Y = PriceF 
X1 = PriceP 
 
 
Y = PriceF 
X1 = PriceP 
X2 = UncalledP 
 
 Y = PriceF 
X1 = PriceP 
X2 = UncalledP 
X3 = Rf 
X4 = Div 
 Y = PriceF 
X1 = PriceP + Ue
(-r+q)t, where (-r+q) is equal to: 
 
Fully-paid Share  
(Y = PriceF) 
Partially-paid Share  
(X = PriceP) 
   
Actual 
 
-10% 
 
0% 
 
10% 
 
Obs 
    
 
 
  
 
  
         Edinburgh and Glasgow Half Shares -1.60 
 
 -4.78 ***  -5.33 ***  -4.33 *** -3.59 ** -4.13 *** -4.72 *** 1,186 
Great Western Half Share Full Shares -3.82 **  -16.36 ***  -16.82 ***  -14.50 *** -8.67 *** -13.21 *** -12.04 *** 2,284 
Great Western Half Share Fifth Shares -3.79 **  -17.83 ***  -18.26 ***  -15.93 *** -10.09 *** -14.21 *** -17.20 *** 2,270 
Great Western Half Share Sixth Shares -1.13 
 
 -9.83 ***  -10.18 ***  -8.90 *** -6.78 *** -8.29 *** -9.75 *** 1,119 
Great Western Half Share Quarter Shares -2.38 
 
 -13.28 ***  -13.18 ***  -11.91 *** -9.31 *** -11.61 *** -11.23 *** 1,379 
London and North Western New Shares -0.87 
 
 -7.52 ***  -8.64 ***  -8.17 *** -2.94 
 
-6.18 *** -6.11 *** 1,050 
London and North Western Fifth Shares -1.27 
 
 -9.07 ***  -10.79 ***  -6.11 *** -5.69 *** -7.07 *** -4.07 *** 1,359 
London and North Western Quarter Shares -1.47 
 
 -6.25 ***  -6.55 ***  -5.03 *** -4.74 *** -4.91 *** -5.04 *** 537 
Midland Half Shares -1.43 
 
 -5.03 ***  -5.72 ***  -4.34 *** -3.35 * -4.23 *** -4.02 *** 1,284 
Midland New Shares -2.02 
 
 -8.84 ***  -9.24 ***  -8.45 *** -5.67 *** -8.27 *** -6.65 *** 989 
York and Newcastle New Shares -2.70 
 
 -6.85 ***  -6.79 ***  -6.37 *** -6.65 *** -6.65 *** -6.07 *** 327 
York, Newcastle and Berwick Extension No. 1 Shares -2.51 
 
 -12.00 ***  -12.04 ***  -9.92 *** -7.04 *** -9.04 *** -10.55 *** 1,008 
York, Newcastle and Berwick Extension No. 2 Shares -1.93 
 
 -6.90 ***  -7.58 ***  -5.19 *** -3.47 ** -4.70 *** -5.23 *** 438 
York and North Midland Half Shares -4.95 ***  -14.35 ***  -14.51 ***  -12.30 *** -10.86 *** -11.67 *** -12.59 *** 1,279 
York and North Midland E&W Riding Shares -0.89 
 
 -5.94 ***  -7.86 ***  -3.82 ** -2.95 
 
-3.31 * -4.20 *** 1,035 
York and North Midland Extension Shares -1.54 
 
 -4.97 ***  -7.40 ***  -2.61 
 
-1.42 
 
-2.00 
 
-2.95 
 
886 
York and North Midland Scarborough Branch Shares -3.31 *  -4.27 **  -4.31 *  -2.90 
 
-2.96 
 
-2.92 
 
-2.90 
 
870 
    
 
  
 
  
 
         
    
 
  
 
  
 
         Notes: Daily share prices and par values obtained from weekly share price tables in Railway Times (1843-50). Engle-Granger 2-step procedure (Engle and Granger, 1987) used to test for cointegration between a partially-paid share and 
equivalent fully-paid share for a particular established railway. Significance shown by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 2: Forfeiture Rates on Railway Share Instalments, using Alternative 
Scenarios for Deadline on Payment 
 
 
 
  
   
 
 
 
 
Time between Instalment 
Due Date and 
Deadline for Payment 
 
  
Criteria Met 
 
Forfeiture Rate 
 
Difference in  
Forfeiture Rates 
SE of 
Difference 
 
N 
 
S-K>=0 S-K<0 
 
S-K>=0 S-K<0 
 
 
 
         
 
 2 Months  225 
 
214 11 
 
10.5% 13.6% 
 
3.2%  (4.1%) 
4 Months  221 
 
197 24 
 
8.5% 19.0% 
 
10.5% *** (2.4%) 
1 Year  163 
 
132 31 
 
5.5% 14.8% 
 
9.3% *** (1.8%) 
2 Years  74 
 
52 22 
 
2.7% 6.3% 
 
3.5% ** (1.7%) 
 
 
         
 
 Notes: Forfeiture rates calculated from data on arrears on calls for capital published in Parliamentary Papers (1848, LXIII, p.275-
442), assuming that any arrears which were still outstanding after the deadline had been forfeited. 
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Table 3: New Railways’ First-day Abnormal Returns 
   
 
Return on 
Partially-paid Shares 
 
 
Return on Fully-paid Shares if 
Partially-paid Shares Treated as Futures 
 
 
Return on Fully-paid Shares if 
Partially-paid Shares Treated as Compound Options 
Year N 
Average 
Paid up (%) 
 
Mean 
SE of  
mean 
  
Mean 
SE of  
mean 
  
Mean  
Difference 
between 
Partial 
and Full 
SE of  
Mean  
Difference 
between 
Partial and 
Full 
 
 
Mean 
SE of  
mean 
  
Mean  
Difference 
between 
Partial 
and Full 
SE of  
Mean  
Difference 
between 
Partial 
and Full 
 
   
 
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
       
1844 38 10.2%  76.2% (17.4%) *** 
 
5.5% (1.9%) *** 
 
70.8% (15.7%) *** 
 
5.0% (2.9%) *  71.2% (15.0%) *** 
1845 79 6.2%  106.7% (13.1%) *** 
 
7.1% (0.9%) *** 
 
99.6% (12.3%) *** 
 
3.4% (1.8%) *  103.4% (11.7%) *** 
1846 40 15.8%  1.9% (9.9%)  
 
3.4% (2.2%)  
 
-1.4% (8.7%)  
 
1.6% (3.3%)   0.3% (7.8%)  
1847 9 20.0%  8.3% (20.7%)  
 
1.3% (4.9%)  
 
7.0% (17.0%)  
 
4.1% (6.7%)   4.2% (15.8%)  
1848 1 10.0%  37.3% .  
 
3.8% .  
 
33.5% .  
 
-0.2% .   37.5% .  
   
 
  
 
   
 
   
 
 
       
Total 167 10.2%  69.0% (8.5%) *** 
 
5.5% (0.9%) *** 
 
63.5% (7.9%) *** 
 
3.3% (1.4%)   65.6% (7.6%)  
                          
 
       
 
Notes: Significance shown by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. When treated as a future a discount rate is assumed of 3 per cent. When treated as an option the price of a partially-paid share is assumed to be the price of 
a compound call option, using assumption of 30 per cent volatility. 
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Table 4: Total Nominal and Par Values of New Railways, 1844-50 
 
 
 
Dec 27,  
1844 
Dec 26,  
1845 
Dec 25,  
1846 
Dec 31,  
1847 
Dec 29,  
1848 
Dec 28,  
1849 
Dec 27,  
1850 
        
Total for All New Railways 
       
Nominal Value (£m) 39.6 158.0 129.0 94.4 79.0 78.8 69.4 
Par Value (£m) 3.7 15.6 24.8 36.0 48.5 57.0 53.9 
        
Average for New Railways 
       
Nominal Value (£m) 0.9 0.8 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.2 
Par Value (£m) 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.9 
        
Number of New Railway Companies 
       
Listed on London Stock Exchange 44.0 186.0 112.0 81.0 69.0 68.0 60.0 
Which could have been  
fully financed by the invested capital 
4.1 18.5 21.6 30.9 42.4 49.2 46.6 
        
Par/Nominal Ratio 9.2% 9.9% 19.2% 38.1% 61.4% 72.3% 77.7% 
        Notes: Nominal Value and Par Value for each company listed on London Stock Exchange obtained from weekly share price tables in Railway Times (1843-50). 
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Table 5: Event Study on Company Returns when Calls for Capital Were Issued 
 
   
One Week  
 
Three Weeks  
 
Five Weeks  
Year 
Number  
of calls  
Mean 
SE of  
mean 
 
 
Mean 
SE of  
mean 
 
 
Mean 
SE of  
mean 
 
     
 
   
 
   
 
1843 22 
 
-4.2% (2.5%)  
 
-0.7% (3.5%)  
 
2.4% (3.0%)  
1844 36 
 
-4.6% (2.1%) ** 
 
-2.5% (3.5%)  
 
4.8% (4.8%)  
1845 110 
 
-4.1% (1.6%) ** 
 
-2.4% (1.7%)  
 
-1.3% (2.2%)  
1846 197 
 
-7.4% (1.9%) *** 
 
-6.0% (2.1%) *** 
 
-3.9% (2.2%) * 
1847 218 
 
-9.1% (1.2%) *** 
 
-7.9% (1.5%) *** 
 
-6.2% (1.7%) *** 
1848 182 
 
-16.1% (1.8%) *** 
 
-14.3% (2.1%) *** 
 
-6.5% (3.4%) * 
1849 149 
 
-11.9% (2.3%) *** 
 
-11.4% (2.3%) *** 
 
-6.9% (2.6%) *** 
1850 57 
 
-10.9% (3.8%) *** 
 
-10.4% (3.6%) *** 
 
-6.1% (6.1%)  
     
 
   
 
   
 
Overall 971 
 
-9.7% (0.7%) *** 
 
-8.4% (0.8%) *** 
 
-4.7% (1.1%) *** 
     
 
   
 
   
 
 
Notes: Share prices and par values obtained from weekly share price tables in Railway Times (1843-1850). Time of call defined as the week on which 
paid up value of the share changes in the share list. Significance shown by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, testing if the mean return is significantly 
different from 0. 
 
 
